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POLICING CYBERSPACE: THE UNCERTAIN 
FUTURE OF DATA PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
ENFORCEMENT IN THE WAKE OF LABMD 
Abstract: On June 6, 2018, in LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (LabMD 
III), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated a Federal Trade 
Commission order that required a small medical laboratory to maintain a reasona-
ble data security program following a data breach. The case presented the Eleventh 
Circuit with the opportunity to clarify the FTC’s data privacy and security en-
forcement powers under Section 5 of the FTC Act. The court, however, only ad-
dressed this issue briefly in dicta, and instead held that the order was unenforceable 
because it was overly-broad. This Comment argues that Eleventh Circuit’s decision 
introduces further confusion about the scope of the FTC’s enforcement authority 
and meaningfully constrains the FTC’s approach to data privacy and security re-
mediation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, reports concerning large-scale data breaches have grabbed 
headlines.1 Not all data breaches, however, make front-page news.2 In 2017, the 
majority of reported data breaches affected small businesses, as opposed to na-
tionally known companies.3 Compared to the losses data breaches cause larger 
enterprises, the damages faced by smaller companies are minimal.4 Neverthe-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See, e.g., Vindu Goel & Rachel Abrams, Hackers Stole Data from Millions of Cards at Saks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2018, at B2 (detailing a data breach that resulted in the theft of five million credit 
and debit card numbers from affiliated retail chains); Mike Isaac et al., Uber Breach, Kept Secret for a 
Year, Hit 57 Million Accounts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2017, at B1 (reporting on Uber’s response to a 
2016 data breach); Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Breach in 2013 Affected All 3 Billion Accounts, Not Just 
One-Third, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2017, at B2 (commenting on the scope of cyberattacks on Yahoo’s 
internal network). 
 2 Matthew Goldstein, Hackers Go After Little Fish, Too, While Trawling for Credit Cards, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 11, 2015, at B2 (noting that data breaches affecting small businesses are often unreported 
because these businesses are not subject to the same public disclosure requirements as publicly-traded 
companies). 
 3 VERIZON, 2018 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5 (11th ed. 2018), https://www.
verizonenterprise.com/resources/reports/rp_DBIR_2018_Report_en_xg.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QNJ-
Q6JE] (finding that 58% of data breach victims qualify as small businesses). Hackers commonly tar-
get small businesses because they store highly-sensitive consumer data, such as credit cards numbers 
and health information, but lack the resources needed to develop robust cybersecurity programs. Lor-
en F. Selznick & Carolyn LaMacchia, Cybersecurity Liability: How Technically Savvy Can We Expect 
Small Business Owners to Be?, 13 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217, 221, 225 (2018). 
 4 Compare Vindu Goel, Verizon’s Cost to Buy Yahoo Is Reduced by $350 Million, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2017, at B3 (reporting that two highly-publicized data breaches devalued Yahoo’s worth by 
$350 million), with AO KASPERSKY LAB, IT SECURITY: COST CENTER OR STRATEGIC INVESTMENT? 
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less, the potentially high costs associated with data breaches can silently kill 
small enterprises that normally operate under narrow profit margins.5 
LabMD, Inc. (“LabMD”) was a small business that sought to make a large 
impact in the wake of a data breach.6 In 2009, the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) investigated LabMD after a data breach exposed its patients’ personal 
information.7 After the FTC filed a complaint against the company, LabMD 
made the unusual decision to defend itself in court.8 Hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in legal fees followed, ultimately causing LabMD to shutter its doors.9 
Although the FTC’s enforcement action eventually forced LabMD out of 
business, LabMD’s choice to contest the complaint may have a significantly last-
ing impact on the FTC.10 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s 
                                                                                                                           
4 (2017), https://go.kaspersky.com/rs/802-IJN-240/images/IT%20Security%20Econmics%20Report%
209.18.17.pdf?aliId=488652022 [https://perma.cc/L3AL-QR4V] (finding that data breaches cost small- 
and medium-sized businesses with 50 to 999 employees an average of $117,000). 
 5 See Protecting Small Businesses from Cyber Attacks: The Cybersecurity Insurance Option, 
Testimony Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 115th Cong. 29 (2017) (statement of Robert Luft, 
President, SureFire Innovations, on behalf of the National Small Business Association, stating that 
cyberattacks on bank accounts cost small businesses an average of $32,021, which can destroy smaller 
companies that lack excess funds); COUNCIL OF BETTER BUS. BUREAUS, 2017 STATE OF CYBERSE-
CURITY AMONG SMALL BUSINESSES IN NORTH AMERICA 14 (2017), https://www.bbb.org/global
assets/shared/media/state-of-cybersecurity/updates/cybersecurity_final-lowres.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H2W3-PPS6] (finding that over 50% of small businesses would become unprofitable within a month 
if they “permanently lost access to essential data”). A data breach might generate costs related to con-
sumer notification, public relations, legal fees, cybersecurity system improvements, insurance premi-
ums increases, lost customer relationships, business devaluation, and more. DELOITTE, BENEATH THE 
SURFACE OF A CYBERATTACK: A DEEPER LOOK AT BUSINESS IMPACTS 3 (2016), https://www2.
deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/risk/us-risk-beneath-the-surface-of-a-cyber-attack.
pdf [https://perma.cc/W5UG-MNFW] (assessing the financial and reputational impact of a data 
breach). 
 6 See Aaron Boyd, Should FTC Regulate Commercial Cybersecurity?, FED. TIMES (Aug. 25, 
2015), https://www.federaltimes.com/2015/08/25/should-ftc-regulate-commercial-cybersecurity/ [https://
perma.cc/K8YM-6KSN] (reporting that LabMD’s CEO aims to change the data security enforcement 
landscape by litigating his company’s case). LabMD provided cancer testing services to patients be-
fore going out of business. LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n (LabMD III), 894 F.3d 1221, 1224 
(11th Cir. 2018) (vacating an FTC order on the grounds of unenforceability). 
 7 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1225. 
 8 See Dune Lawrence, A Leak Wounded This Company. Fighting the Feds Finished It Off, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-labmd-ftc-tiversa/ (specify-
ing that LabMD was the first company to litigate, rather than settle, an FTC data security complaint). 
Most companies faced with FTC enforcement actions chose to settle because the possible litigation 
costs often exceed the potential penalties. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the 
New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 611–13 (2014) (arguing that the FTC has 
developed a body of data privacy and security law through a common law-like approach). Moreover, 
companies that settle with the FTC can do so without admitting liability. Id. at 613. 
 9 Lawrence, supra note 8. By 2013, LabMD amassed over a half-million dollars in legal fees. Id. 
Within a year of the FTC’s initial complaint, the company’s annual revenue was cut in half. Id. LabMD 
was also unable to secure insurance. Id. 
 10 See Rafael Reyneri, Eleventh Circuit LabMD Decision Potentially Limits FTC’s Remedial 
Powers, COVINGTON: GLOBAL POLICY WATCH (June 11, 2018), https://www.globalpolicywatch.com/
2018/06/eleventh-circuit-labmd-decision-potentially-limits-ftcs-remedial-powers/ [https://perma.cc/
2019] Policing Cyberspace II.-151 
2018 decision in LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission (LabMD III) argua-
bly calls into question the scope of the FTC’s enforcement authority and remedi-
al powers in the data privacy and security space.11 
Part I of this Comment gives an overview of the factual background, legal 
framework, and procedural history of LabMD III.12 Part II of this Comment ex-
amines and discusses the Eleventh Circuit’s central holding.13 Finally, Part III of 
this Comment argues that LabMD III perpetuates confusion about the scope of 
the FTC’s authority and unduly constrains the FTC’s remedial powers.14 
I. THE CONTEXT AND HISTORY OF LABMD 
Section of A of this Part details the facts underlying LabMD III.15 Section B 
of this Part provides an overview of the FTC’s regulation of data privacy and 
security in the United States.16 Section C of this Part outlines the procedural his-
tory of LabMD III.17 
A. Factual Background 
LabMD was founded in Atlanta and, for several years, operated as a medi-
cal laboratory that tested patient samples for urologists.18 In 2005, a LabMD bill-
ing manager installed LimeWire, an application that allowed users to share files 
between computers, on a work computer in violation of company policy.19 Fol-
lowing LimeWire’s installation, the billing manager unknowingly shared her 
“My Documents” folder to a peer-to-peer network that was accessible by mil-
                                                                                                                           
6Z7W-6SDQ] (commenting on how LabMD III potentially curtailed the FTC’s authority to enforce 
broad consent orders). 
 11 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231, 1236 (addressing the question of the FTC’s enforcement 
authority in dicta and holding that the FTC needs to employ greater specificity in its consent orders); 
Alison Frankel, There’s a Big Problem for the FTC Lurking in the 11th Circuit’s LabMD Data-
Security Ruling, REUTERS (June 15, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-labmd/theres-a-big-
problem-for-the-ftc-lurking-in-11th-circuits-labmd-data-security-ruling-idUSKCN1J32S2 
[https://perma.cc/JBJ6-E2Z2]  (arguing that LabMD III potentially affects how the FTC will draft 
future consent orders and ground forthcoming complaints). 
 12 See infra notes 15–51 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 52–69 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 70–108 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 18–26 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 27–42 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. 
 18 Lawrence, supra note 8. LabMD no longer provides services to consumers, but the company 
still exists and continues to retain electronic consumer records. LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1224 n.3. 
 19 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1224. During the period relevant to LabMD III, LimeWire was popu-
larly used for sharing music and video files. Id. In 2010, a court-ordered injunction mandated that 
LimeWire disable the functionality of its software after the company was found liable for inducement 
of copyright infringement, common law copyright infringement, and unfair competition. Arista Rec-
ords LLC v. Lime Wire LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115675, at *6, *21–23 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 
2010). 
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lions of LimeWire users.20 Between July 2007 and May 2008, the shared folder 
included a 1,718-page spreadsheet containing the personal information of rough-
ly 9,300 LabMD patients (the “Insurance File”).21 In May 2008, a third party 
discovered the Insurance File and reported it to the FTC, leading to an investiga-
tion of LabMD’s data privacy and security practices. 22 
The FTC subsequently received news of a separate potential security 
breach involving LabMD patients.23 In October 2012, local police in Sacramen-
to, California raided the home of suspected identity thieves and discovered rec-
ords containing the personal information of an additional 600 LabMD patients 
(the “Sacramento Documents”).24 
After assessing these two security breaches, the FTC filed an administrative 
complaint against LabMD in August 2013.25 The complaint alleged that the la-
boratory engaged in unfair practices by failing to implement “reasonable and 
appropriate” data security measures.26 
                                                                                                                           
 20 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1224. Peer-to-peer networks allow users to exchanges files and infor-
mation between computers over the Internet without connection to a centralized server computer. JAY 
DRATLER, JR., CYBERLAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM § 6.03 (2018). 
 21 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1224. The Insurance File included patient names, social security num-
bers, dates of birth, medical test codes and health insurance information. Id. 
 22 Id. at 1224–25. Triversa, a cybersecurity consulting firm concentrating in peer-to-peer monitor-
ing services, uncovered the Insurance File. Id. Triversa downloaded the Insurance File and later at-
tempted to use the document to market its cybersecurity remediation services to LabMD. Id. LabMD, 
however, removed LimeWire from its computer systems and declined Triversa’s services. Id. As a 
result, Triversa reported the incident to the FTC. Id. 
 23 In re LabMD, Inc. (LabMD I), No. 9357, 2015 WL 7575033, at *30 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015), 
vacated, In re LabMD, Inc. (LabMD II), No. 9357, 2016 WL 4128215 (F.T.C. July 28, 2016), vacat-
ed, LabMD III, 894 F.3d 1221. 
 24 Id. at *28. The Sacramento Documents included copies of billing documents, checks, patient 
names, and social security numbers. Id. LabMD’s digital billing system likely created the billing doc-
uments found, but LabMD did not store these records electronically. Id. at *29. It is unclear how paper 
copies of LabMD billing documents made their way to California and how this security incident might 
have related to the LimeWire breach. See id. at *29–30 (summarizing the history of the Sacramento 
Documents without explaining how the alleged identity thieves procured them). The FTC alleged that 
some social security numbers found in the Sacramento Documents were used under different names, 
thereby signaling identity theft. Complaint at 5, LabMD I, 2015 WL 7575033 (2015) (No. 9357), 2013 
WL 5232775, at *5 (F.T.C. Aug. 29, 2013). 
 25 Complaint, supra note 24, at 1. The FTC commences enforcement actions by investigating 
entities that it reasonably believes have violated statutory law or engaged in deceptive or unfair prac-
tices. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 609. When investigators conclude that an entity engaged in 
illegal activity, the FTC issues a complaint detailing the alleged violations and proposed remedies. Id. 
If an entity chooses to dispute an FTC complaint, it may respond before an administrative or federal 
district judge. Id. 
 26 Complaint, supra note 24, at 5. For example, the complaint contended that LabMD failed to 
sufficiently train its employees to protect personal information. Id. at 3. The FTC also alleged that 
LabMD did not implement commonly available measures to detect system vulnerabilities or detect 
unlawful access to the personal information. Id. at 3. 
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B. Legal Framework 
In the absence of robust federal data privacy and security laws, the FTC has 
emerged as the nation’s primary privacy and data security enforcer.27 The Feder-
al Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which establishes the FTC’s role, does 
not expressly empower the FTC to police data privacy and security.28 Nonethe-
less, as of December 2017, the FTC has brought over 500 enforcement actions 
related to consumer privacy protection and over 60 cases regarding data securi-
ty.29 The FTC derives its authority to enforce data privacy and security actions in 
part through powers conferred by sector-specific statutes.30 Where such statutes 
                                                                                                                           
 27 Anne E. Kane, Regulation Under Section 5: Data Security and the FTC: FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Summer 2015, at 41. Several federal statutes target cybersecuri-
ty concerns within specific sectors, but there is no federal data privacy or security law that blankets all 
online activity. Id. Instead, states have enacted separate data privacy and security laws that vary sig-
nificantly in scope, as demonstrated by differing definitions of “personal information” in data breach 
notification statutes. Compare, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b (2018) (defining “personal infor-
mation” as a consumer’s name used in combination with a social security number, state identification 
number, or financial account number), with MO. REV. STAT. § 407.1500 (2018) (defining “personal 
information” as an individual’s name used in combination with a social security number, government 
identification number, financial account number or identifier, medical information, or health insurance 
information). In 2018, California enacted a new law that provides broad privacy protections to con-
sumers. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Stat. ch. 55 (granting consumers the 
right to request deletion of their personal information, opt-out of the sale of their personal information, 
and receive information about businesses’ data collection practices). Effective in 2020, this law may 
pave the way for more comprehensive privacy legislation at the state and federal levels. Lother De-
termann, Broad Data and Business Regulation, Applicable Worldwide, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY 
PROFS. (July 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/analysis-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/ 
[https://perma.cc/UZK5-DGZ7]. 
 28 See Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: 
The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 707 (2013) (discussing 
how the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”) fails to reference data security). See generally 
FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41−58 (2012) (lacking mention of the FTC’s authority to regulate data privacy 
and security matters). Although the FTC Act grants the Commission broad rulemaking authority, the 
FTC has resisted exercising this authority in the cybersecurity context because the process is slow and 
inefficient. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra, at 598–99. 
 29 FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA PRIVACY & SECURITY UPDATE: 2017, at 2, 4 (2018), https://www.
ftc.gov/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2017-overview-commissions-enforcement-policy-initiatives 
[https://perma.cc/UWE5-KF93]. The upswing in FTC enforcement actions has increasingly inspired 
companies to incorporate Chief Privacy Officers into corporate governance structures. Victoria L. 
Schwartz, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1741 (2016) (theorizing 
explanations for failures in corporate privacy). 
 30 Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2230, 2251–52 (2015) (examining federal data privacy and security laws that 
expressly grant the FTC enforcement authority). For example, the Children’s Online Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1998 requires the FTC to regulate websites targeted to children thirteen and under and 
bring related enforcement actions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502(b), 6505. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act author-
izes the FTC to issue and enforce data privacy and security regulations against financial institutions. 
Id. §§ 6804(a)(1)(C), 6805(a). 
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are inapplicable, Section 5 of the FTC Act (“Section 5”) empowers the FTC with 
broad authority to regulate deceptive or unfair commercial practices.31 
Early data privacy and security actions brought under Section 5 typically 
invoked its deception prong.32 In those cases, the FTC argued that businesses 
deceived consumers by misrepresenting the nature of their data privacy or secu-
rity controls in company policies.33 In recent years, however, the FTC has in-
creasingly regulated data privacy and security under Section 5’s unfairness 
prong.34 A business practice is unfair when it leads to a substantial consumer 
injury that consumers cannot prevent and is not counterbalanced by a benefit 
conferred to consumers or other businesses.35 
The FTC’s broad exercise of authority under the unfairness prong has 
proved controversial among scholars.36 Yet because the vast majority of such 
FTC complaints are settled through consent order procedures, the FTC’s authori-
ty has rarely been litigated in court.37 
                                                                                                                           
 31 FTC Act § 5(a)(2) (empowering the FTC to regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce”); see Hartzog & Solove, supra note 30, at 2253 (stating that Section 5 of the 
FTC Act (“Section 5”) grants FTC jurisdiction over all industries except those expressly excluded). 
For example, in 2017, the FTC filed a complaint against VIZIO, Inc. alleging that the company en-
gaged in unfair and deceptive acts by installing software on internet-connected televisions that tracked 
consumers’ viewing data without consent. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. VIZIO, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-00758, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219381, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 13, 2017). 
 32 Hartzog & Solove, supra note 30, at 2235. The FTC finds an omission, practice, or representa-
tion to be deceptive when it misleads a reasonable consumer to their detriment. Letter from James C. 
Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983). 
 33 Hartzog & Solove, supra note 30, at 2235. 
 34 Alexander E. Reicher & Yan Fang, FTC Privacy and Data Security Enforcement and Guidance 
Under Section 5, 25 J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. BOARD CAL. 89, 90 (2016). Certain 
FTC data privacy enforcement actions have involved allegations of both deceptive and unfair practic-
es. See, e.g., In re Gateway Learning Corp., 138 F.T.C. 443, 449–50 (2004) (alleging that an educa-
tional company engaged in deceptive and unfair practices by providing third parties with children’s 
personal data without properly revising its privacy policy). 
 35 FTC Act § 5(n). 
 36 See, e.g., Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 28, at 710–11 (contending that the FTC’s com-
plaints and consent orders are overly vague and do not provide businesses with fair notice of the cy-
bersecurity practices that violate Section 5). The FTC’s broad exercise of unfairness authority in the 
cybersecurity space also has its supporters. See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Big 
Data, Discrimination and the FTC’s Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 361 (2015) (arguing that 
the FTC Act can provide a useful framework for policing “big data”). 
 37 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 610−11. To settle an FTC enforcement action, either the 
FTC or the respondent may propose the terms of a consent agreement that waives the parties’ rights to 
judicial review. Id. at 610. Once the FTC approves the consent agreement, it makes the terms availa-
ble for public comment for a specified period of time before finalizing the order. Id. Businesses tend 
to settle with the FTC in cybersecurity actions because the cost of litigation is significant, the likeli-
hood of victory is small, and companies are not required to admit wrongdoing. Id. at 611−13. 
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Prior to the LabMD decision, the most significant challenge to the FTC’s 
data privacy and security enforcement authority concluded in the FTC’s favor.38 
In 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Federal Trade Com-
mission v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. affirmed the FTC’s authority to enforce 
data privacy and security under Section 5’s unfairness prong.39 The court further 
stated that the FTC provided the defendant with fair notice that its data privacy 
and security controls failed to meet the FTC’s standards of fairness.40 Because 
the defendant in Wyndham declined to appeal the Third Circuit’s decision, open 
questions remained regarding the nature and scope of the FTC’s authority.41 
Scholars anticipated that LabMD III might provide necessary clarifications.42 
C. Procedural History 
LabMD’s decision to challenge the FTC’s initial administrative complaint 
led to prolonged and publicly contentious litigation.43 LabMD secured a relative-
ly early victory when an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) dismissed the case 
based on the FTC’s reliance on evidence that lacked credibility.44 The ALJ con-
                                                                                                                           
 38 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 247 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the FTC may bring data security enforcement actions under Section 5’s unfairness 
prong); Crystal N. Skelton, FTC Data Security Enforcement: Analyzing the Past, Present, and Future, 
25 J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. BOARD CAL. 305, 309−10 (2016) (noting that Wyndham 
was the first federal case to challenge the FTC’s data security enforcement authority). 
 39 See Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 247−49 (concluding that deficient data security systems could be 
seen as unfair and the existence of sector-specific federal data security statutes does not preclude FTC 
enforcement of data security). The defendant in Wyndham was a hospitality chain that experienced 
three separate cyber-attacks between 2008 and 2009. Id. at 240. In total, hackers stole the personal 
information of approximately 619,000 consumers, leading to at least $10.6 million in consumer loss. 
Id. at 242. The defendant contested the complaint issued by the FTC in the aftermath of the attacks, 
arguing, in part, that the FTC did not have the authority to bring action on grounds of unfairness under 
Section 5. Id. at 244−47. 
 40 Id. at 259. The defendant argued that, absent an official decree or regulation from the FTC, it 
lacked constitutionally fair notice of what the FTC considered a fair data security system under Sec-
tion 5. Id. at 253–54. The court rejected this argument because the FTC had developed a significant 
volume of guidelines, complaints, and consent decrees outlining the FTC’s position on cybersecurity 
matters. Id. at 256−57. 
 41 See Stipulated Order for Injunction at 6, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 
Civ. No. 2:13-CV-01887-ES-JAD (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2015) (setting forth a settlement agreement be-
tween the parties). 
 42 See, e.g., Stuart L. Pardau & Blake Edwards, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Privacy 
by Design: New Legal Frontiers in Cybersecurity, 12 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 227, 230 (2017) (speculating 
that the Eleventh Circuit’s review of LabMD III could provide “fertile ground” for understanding the 
FTC’s role in regulating cybersecurity). 
 43 See Gabe Maldoff, LabMD and the New Definition of Privacy Harm, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY 
PROFS. (Aug. 22, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/labmd-and-the-new-definition-of-privacy-harm/ [https://
perma.cc/47Q3-NJYG] (noting that LabMD’s CEO published a book, entitled The Devil Inside the 
Beltway, that criticized the FTC’s perceived overextension of power in the data privacy and security 
enforcement context). 
 44 See LabMD I, 2015 WL 7575033, at *65 (F.T.C. Nov. 13, 2015) (dismissing the FTC’s com-
plaint). The FTC’s complaint argued that LabMD’s two known security breaches caused, or were 
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cluded that LabMD’s data security practices were unlikely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers, and thus, the FTC failed to support an essential element of 
its Section 5 unfairness claim.45 
The FTC appealed the dismissal to the FTC’s commissioners.46 In 2016, the 
FTC commissioners reversed the ALJ’s decision, finding that the FTC sufficient-
ly demonstrated that the Insurance File’s exposure caused substantial injury to 
consumers under Section 5’s unfairness prong.47 Contemporaneously with its 
reversal, the FTC issued a cease and desist order requiring LabMD to take cer-
tain corrective actions to establish a more reasonable data security system (the 
“Order”).48 LabMD appealed the Order to the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the 
FTC lacked the authority to issue the Order and that the standard of reasonable-
ness described in the Order was exceedingly vague.49 In June 2018, the Eleventh 
Circuit vacated the Order on the grounds that it was not sufficiently specific.50 
The court declined to rule on the scope of the FTC’s Section 5 enforcement au-
thority.51 
II. DISCUSSING THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN LABMD III 
Section A of this Part discusses the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ deci-
sion to bypass questions concerning the FTC’s authority to bring data privacy 
                                                                                                                           
likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers. Id. at *2. The FTC’s claim relied on evidence that 
Triversa found information contained in the Insurance File at numerous IP addresses, at least one of 
which belonged to a possible identity thief. Id. at *47. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) regarded 
this evidence as unreliable, concluding that there was no clear indication that the exposure of the In-
surance File through LimeWire caused, or was likely to cause, identity theft harm. Id. The court fur-
ther noted that the exposure of the Insurance File was unlikely to cause medical identity theft, reputa-
tional, or other harms. Id. at *50−53. 
 45 See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
 46 LabMD II, 2016 WL 4128215, at *7. Any party may appeal an ALJ decision by filing notice 
with the Secretary of the FTC and submitting an appellate brief. 16 C.F.R. § 3.52(b) (2015). Once the 
parties have had the opportunity to file reply briefs, the FTC will either schedule an oral argument or 
issue its final decision in the matter. Id. In this case, the FTC reviewed the factual findings and legal 
conclusions of the case de novo, applying new logical inferences, as needed. LabMD II, 2016 WL 
4128215, at *7. 
 47 LabMD II, 2016 WL 412821, at *21. The FTC reasoned that the unauthorized disclosure of 
personal information caused an intangible privacy harm and could likely result in substantial injury. 
Id. The FTC, however, held that the FTC did not sufficiently support the allegation that the exposure 
of the Sacramento Documents stemmed from failures in LabMD’s computer security program. Id. 
 48 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1227. By its terms, the cease-and-desist order the FTC issued (the “Or-
der”) was scheduled to terminate on the later of July 18, 2036, or twenty years from the last date that 
the FTC alleged violation of the Order. Id. 
 49 Id. at 1230–31. LabMD also moved to stay enforcement of the Order, which the Eleventh Cir-
cuit granted. LabMD v. Fed. Trade Comm’n (LabMD III Motion for Stay), 678 F. App’x 816, 822 
(11th Cir. 2016). 
 50 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1224. The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the FTC’s legal conclusions de 
novo, giving a degree of deference to the FTC’s interpretation of unfairness. Id. at 1227. 
 51 Id. at 1231. 
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and security actions under Section 5.52 Section B of this Part examines the 
court’s conclusion that the Order was unenforceable.53 
A. The FTC’s Authority to Enforce Data Privacy and Security 
One of the questions presented on appeal was whether the FTC had authori-
ty to enforce data privacy and security matters under Section 5.54 If the Eleventh 
Circuit accepted LabMD’s argument that it did not, and accordingly held that the 
FTC overreached its powers, it would have split from the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which previously upheld the FTC’s enforcement authority.55 A circuit 
split of this magnitude would have increased the likelihood that the Supreme 
Court would take the matter under review.56 
The Eleventh Circuit avoided this potential split entirely by accepting, for 
the sake of argument, that LabMD’s failure to implement a reasonable data secu-
rity system qualified as an unfair act or practice under Section 5.57 The FTC ar-
gued that LabMD’s data security program was unfair because it caused substan-
tial, unpreventable injury to consumers by invading their right to privacy and 
such injury was not counterbalanced by public policy considerations.58 Accept-
ing this arguendo, the court noted that an unfair act or practice must not only 
cause substantial injury, but also be rooted in the Constitution, statute, or com-
                                                                                                                           
 52 See infra notes 54–61 and accompanying text. 
 53 See infra notes 62–69 and accompanying text. 
 54 LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n (LabMD III), 894 F.3d 1221, 1230 (11th Cir. 2018). Crit-
ics of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in 2018, in LabMD, Inc. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, believed this was a missed opportunity to clarify ambiguities in the cybersecurity enforce-
ment space. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Thomas, 11th Circuit Avoids Opining on FTC’s Authority to Police 
Negligent Data Security Practices in Healthcare, HYMAN, PHELPS & MCNAMARA (June 14, 2018), 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/2018/06/the-eleventh-circuit-avoids-opining-on-the-ftcs-authority-to-
police-negligent-data-security-practices-in-healthcare/ [https://perma.cc/35VK-4HSP] (stating that 
many observers were disappointed by the court’s failure to rule on the scope of the FTC’s Section 5 
authority). 
 55 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231 (assuming arguendo that the FTC Act empowered the FTC to 
bring suit); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 247−49 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the FTC could bring cybersecurity claims under its Section 5 authority). 
 56 See Tejas N. Narechania, Certiorari, Universality, and a Patent Puzzle, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
1345, 1359–60 (2018) (citing empirical studies demonstrating that the majority of the Supreme 
Court’s cases involve circuit splits). Not all circuit splits, however, result in Supreme Court review. 
Id. at 1360. In deciding whether to grant certiorari, the Supreme Court will evaluate whether a circuit 
split causes a sharp division in the application of federal law that creates geographical inconsistency. 
Id. The Supreme Court is less likely to review alleged splits that stem from factual or doctrinal dis-
tinctions. Id. 
 57 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231. 
 58 Id. Generally, in dismissing a case, a court will make assumptions arguendo when the outcome 
of the case hinges on another line of reasoning. Joshua S. Stillman, The Dangers of Hypothetical Stat-
utory Jurisdiction (Even When Jurisdiction Exists), 4 SAVANNAH L. REV. 129, 136 n.56 (2017). 
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mon law.59 Although the FTC did not identify the legal principle underlying the 
unfairness of LabMD’s data security program, the court assumed that the FTC’s 
complaint was grounded in common law negligence for the purposes of its deci-
sion.60 
After determining that it need not address questions regarding the scope of 
the FTC’s enforcement authority to resolve the case, the Eleventh Circuit turned 
to the narrower issue of the Order’s enforceability.61 
B. Unenforceability of the FTC’s Order 
The Eleventh Circuit vacated the Order on the grounds that it was unen-
forceable due to vagueness.62 The court noted that remedial orders generally re-
quire clarity and precision to ensure that each respondent can comply with rea-
sonable certainty.63 The Order, however, simply mandated that LabMD imple-
ment and maintain a “reasonably designed” cybersecurity program that would 
protect consumers’ personal information.64 The Order did not explicitly prohibit 
LabMD from engaging in any particular act or practice.65 This lack of specificity 
made the Order unenforceable because it would be impossible for LabMD to 
comply with the FTC’s vague standard of reasonableness without further guid-
ance.66 
                                                                                                                           
 59 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231. Subsection (n) of Section 5 states that the FTC may consider 
public policy in determining “unfairness,” but “public policy considerations may not serve as a prima-
ry basis for such determination.” FTC Act § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). In LabMD III, the Elev-
enth Circuit interpreted Section 5 to mean that the existence of a substantial consumer injury alone 
could not establish an unfairness claim under Section 5. LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1229 n.24. 
 60 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231. The FTC’s argument rested on the idea that LabMD unintention-
ally invaded its consumers’ right to privacy. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that negligence theory can 
support unintentional invasion claims. Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1236. Although the court’s decision turned on the Order’s vagueness, LabMD devoted 
comparatively little attention to this argument in its answer brief. See Brief of Petitioner, LabMD, Inc. 
at 51–52, LabMD III, 894 F.3d 1221 (No. 9357), 2016 WL 7474626, at *51–52 (dedicating only two 
paragraphs to the argument that the Order was “impermissibly vague”). 
 63 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1235. The court noted that “an order’s prohibitions should be clear and 
precise in order that they may be understood by those against whom they are directed.” Id. (quoting 
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965)). 
 64 Id. at 1236. The applicable portion of the Order required LabMD to “establish and implement, 
and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive information security program that is reasonably designed to 
protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information collected from or about 
consumers.” Id. The court noted that the Order’s other provisions were similarly vague. Id. at 1236 & 
n.41. 
 65 Id. at 1236. The FTC’s initial complaint did not allege that LabMD engaged in a particular 
unfair act or practice. Id. at 1225. Instead, it alleged that LabMD’s data security program was unrea-
sonable because the company failed to take certain data security measures that made the program 
deficient overall. Id. 
 66 Id. at 1235–36. The court stated that the Order, if upheld, would require LabMD to completely 
revamp its data security program. Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that the Order’s vagueness prevented it from 
being enforced through any available methods.67 If the FTC filed a complaint in 
district court alleging that LabMD violated the Order’s reasonableness require-
ments, the FTC would have difficulty proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that LabMD failed to comply with the Order because reasonableness is a flexible 
standard.68 Alternatively, if the FTC filed a contempt motion related to a court-
issued injunction, the district court would be placed in the difficult position of 
controlling LabMD’s business decisions at the recommendation of the FTC.69 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF LABMD III 
Section A of this Part argues that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ de-
cision in LabMD III creates unnecessary confusion regarding the scope of the 
FTC’s enforcement powers under Section 5.70 Section B of this Part contends 
that LabMD III places undue restrictions on the FTC’s remedial powers in data 
privacy security actions.71 
A. The Uncertain Scope of the FTC’s Section 5 Enforcement  
Power Following LabMD III 
By declining to evaluate the FTC’s authority to enforce data privacy and 
security under Section 5’s unfairness prong, the Eleventh Circuit missed a criti-
                                                                                                                           
 67 Id. at 1237. There are two avenues for enforcing FTC cease and desist orders. Id. at 1234. First, 
the FTC may file a civil-penalty action in a district court alleging that a respondent violated an exist-
ing cease and desist order. FTC Act § 5(l). The district court may impose a penalty of up to $10,000 
for each violation of the cease and desist order. Id. If the district court believes the respondent will 
continue to violate the cease and desist, it may issue an injunction. Id. Second, if the FTC has secured 
an injunction against the respondent, it may file a motion with the district court to find the respondent 
in contempt. LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1234. In such cases, the respondent would be required to demon-
strate that its actions have not violated the cease and desist order. Id. If the respondent fails to con-
vince the court that a violation did not occur, the court will issue a show cause order. Id. For the re-
spondent to ultimately be held in contempt, the FTC would need to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the respondent violated the injunction. Id. 
 68 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1236–37. The court hypothesized what would happen if the FTC brought 
a complaint alleging that LabMD’s failure to implement a specific data security measure (“X”) that vio-
lated the Order. Id. The court theorized that LabMD and the FTC would then present competing expert 
testimony addressing whether X was a necessary component of a “reasonably designed” data security 
program. Id. The district court would then likely hold that it could not weigh the comparative value of the 
expert testimony, meaning that the FTC would fail to prove LabMD’s contempt of the Order by clear and 
convincing evidence. Id. at 1236–37. 
 69 Id. at 1237. If a district court held that LabMD’s failure to implement X violated an injunction, 
the Eleventh Circuit believed that such holding would effectively modify the injunction. Id. Such 
holding would set precedent for future modifications, meaning that the FTC would essentially use the 
power of the court to direct LabMD’s business. Id. 
 70 See infra notes 72–89 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 90–108 and accompanying text. 
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cal opportunity to clarify the scope of the FTC’s enforcement powers.72 If the 
court interpreted Section 5’s unfairness prong as authorizing the FTC to enforce 
data privacy and security, it would have strengthened the FTC’s enforcement 
efforts and further legitimized the current enforcement scheme.73 Conversely, if 
the Eleventh Circuit held that the FTC lacked authority to bring suit against 
LabMD, it would have created a split with the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.74 
A circuit split would have increased the likelihood that the matter would be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court, thereby conclusively defining the scope of the 
FTC’s authority.75 Moreover, the broad invalidation of prior FTC data enforce-
ment actions may have motivated Congress to explicitly implement a federal 
data privacy and security regulatory scheme.76 Either way, a ruling on the ques-
tion of the FTC’s Section 5 enforcement authority would have brought greater 
transparency and predictability to the future of data privacy and security en-
forcement.77 
Instead, the court allowed the FTC’s enforcement authority under Section 
5’s unfairness prong to remain unchallenged, while simultaneously introducing 
an arguable restraint on the scope of that authority in dicta.78 Under Section 5, an 
act or practice is unfair when it leads to a substantial consumer injury that con-
sumers cannot prevent and is not outweighed by benefits to consumers or busi-
nesses.79 LabMD III potentially limits which acts or practices qualify as unfair 
under Section 5 by asserting that unfairness must also be grounded in the Consti-
                                                                                                                           
 72 See Pardau & Edwards, supra note 42, at 230 (noting that LabMD, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n 
(LabMD III), 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018), presented the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals with 
the opportunity to define the scope FTC’s data privacy and security enforcement authority). 
 73 See id. at 263 (stating that judicial approval of FTC enforcement actions could inspire the FTC 
to regulate data privacy and security with increasing regularity). 
 74 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 246−47 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(validating the FTC’s ability to bring data privacy and security enforcement actions under Section 5’s 
unfairness prong). 
 75 See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 76 See Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Google Faces Calls for Privacy Legislation, FTC 
Probe After Exposing User Data, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2018/10/09/the-cybersecurity-202-google-faces-calls-for-
privacy-legislation-ftc-probe-after-exposing-user-data/5bbb86201b326b7c8a8d189f/?utm_term=.9205
b09aaa34 [https://perma.cc/85U3-EFHD] (reporting that a Google data breach prompted Democratic 
officials to request an FTC investigation and the enactment of a federal privacy law). 
 77 Ganka Hadjipetrova & Hannah G. Poteat, States Are Coming to the Fore of Privacy in the 
Digital Era, LANDSLIDE, July/Aug. 2014,  at 12, 14 (arguing that the FTC cannot regulate data privacy 
and security without assistance from state regulators, in part, because the scope of FTC’s enforcement 
authority is still disputed). 
 78 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231 (accepting the FTC’s authority to regulate data privacy and 
security arguendo, while also requiring that authority to derive from the Constitution, statute, or 
common law). 
 79 FTC Act § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
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tution, statute, or the common law.80 The court stated that mere consumer injury 
is insufficient to support a Section 5 enforcement claim.81 
Although the Eleventh Circuit stated this requirement in dicta, it introduced 
an additional factor to Section 5’s unfairness test that would meaningfully re-
strain future FTC data security enforcement actions if followed by other courts.82 
The FTC would be unable to ground future Section 5 unfairness claims in a con-
stitutional right to privacy because the Constitution does not protect against the 
mishandling of personal information by private companies.83 The FTC would 
also struggle to root such actions in statute because it relies on its Section 5 au-
thority in cases where existing data privacy and security statutes are inopera-
tive.84 Accordingly, the FTC would need to support its Section 5 unfairness ac-
tions by appealing to common law theories like negligence or breach of fiduci-
ary duty.85 Many courts, however, have struggled to find the requisite elements 
of common law causes of action in other data security cases.86 
The Eleventh Circuit did little to clarify whether it believes that the intro-
duction of a stricter unfairness test should significantly constrain Section 5 un-
fairness claims.87 The court simply assumed arguendo that the FTC grounded its 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231 (stating in dicta that an FTC enforcement action would be 
invalidated if it was not grounded in established policies found in the Constitution, statute, or the 
common law). 
 81 Id. at 1229 n.24. 
 82 See Frankel, supra note 11 (contending that future litigants could point to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s dictum when challenging the validity of FTC complaints). A dictum does not carry the same 
authority as court holdings, but some construe dictum as “quasi-authority” because it generally influ-
ences future court decisions. EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES: A COURSE OF INSTRUC-
TION IN READING AND STATING REPORTED CASES, COMPOSING HEAD-NOTES AND BRIEFS, CRITICIZ-
ING AND COMPARING AUTHORITIES, AND COMPILING DIGESTS 103 (2d ed. 1894) (providing instruc-
tion on how to interpret court cases). 
 83 William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 975–76 (2016) 
(comparing the FTC’s enforcement authority to that of its European counterparts). 
 84 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 30, at 2236 (positing that Section 5 is broadly drafted to 
allow the FTC to regulate sectors not otherwise regulated by statute). 
 85 See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach 
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 749 (2018) (listing negligence and breach of fiduciary duty as common 
causes of action alleged in the wake of data breach). 
 86 See David J. Baldwin et al., Insuring Against Privacy Claims Following a Data Breach, 122 
PENN. ST. L. REV. 633, 689–91 (2017) (noting that courts have been inconsistent in finding negligence 
in data breach cases). In particular, data breaches can bring into question whether a company that 
holds consumer data is under duty to protect it. Id. at 689–90. In cases where a hacker steals personal 
information from company computer systems, courts are reluctant to hold the company liable for 
third-party criminal activity. Id. at 690–91. Additionally, courts often reject the argument that data 
breaches lead to cognizable harm if consumers experience no monetary, property, or physical damage. 
Solove & Citron, supra note 85, at 754. 
 87 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231 (accepting arguendo that the FTC’s litigation against LabMD is 
supported by a theory of negligence without providing detailed support for that proposition). Although 
the Eleventh Circuit assumed arguendo that the FTC had sufficient grounds for bringing suit, it previous-
ly questioned whether Section 5 covered intangible consumer injuries when granting LabMD’s motion 
for stay of the Order. See LabMD v. Fed. Trade Comm’n (LabMD III Motion for Stay), 678 F. App’x 
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complaint in common law negligence without in-depth analysis.88 Accordingly, 
the Eleventh Circuit added further uncertainty into the data privacy and security 
enforcement arena by introducing a new unfairness test for consideration by oth-
er courts, yet failing to apply it.89 
B. LabMD III’s Undue Restrictions on the FTC’s Remedial Powers in Data 
Privacy and Security Enforcement Actions 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision also placed unwarranted restrictions on the 
FTC’s remedial power by invalidating its historical approach to data privacy and 
security consent orders.90 The court struck down the Order because it required 
LabMD to comply with a standard of reasonableness that the court found unjus-
tifiably vague.91 The concept of reasonableness, however, is not as vague as the 
court suggested.92 As noted in its appellate brief, the FTC regularly issues mate-
rials that clarify its position on established and emerging data privacy and securi-
ty issues.93 The FTC has also entered into numerous publicly available settle-
ment agreements that specifically detail its view of reasonable data security pro-
grams.94 The Third Circuit, in Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham World-
wide Corp., cited these materials and settlement agreements as relevant in de-
                                                                                                                           
816, 820–21 (11th Cir. 2016) (holding that Section 5 does not clearly support the FTC’s authority to 
enforce actions related to intangible harms). The court had intimated that LabMD made a persuasive 
argument that the injury contemplated in this case was “not even intangible . . . but purely conceptual.” 
Id. 
 88 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1231 (stating that the FTC could conceivably establish an unfair-
ness claim in data security actions by pointing to common law negligence). 
 89 See id. (declining to analyze the supposed negligence claim underlying LabMD III in detail). 
 90 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, Did the LabMD Case Weaken the FTC’s Approach 
to Data Security?, TEACH PRIVACY (June 8, 2018), https://teachprivacy.com/did-labmd-case-weaken-
ftc-approach-to-data-security/ [https://perma.cc/3FKE-PKB4] (indicating that the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision does not fully consider the context of the FTC’s data privacy and security enforcement pro-
gram). 
 91 LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1236–37. 
 92 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 90 (arguing that the Eleventh Circuit exaggerated the ambi-
guities created by the application of a reasonableness standard). 
 93 Brief of the Federal Trade Commission, at 50–52, LabMD III, 894 F.3d 1221 (No. 9357), 2017 
WL 562771, at *50–52. These materials are publicly-available on the FTC’s website. See, e.g., FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, DATA BREACH RESPONSE: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0154_data-breach-response-guide-for-business.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9NWC-MDRW] (recommending measures that businesses should take in the wake of a data 
breach); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PEER-TO-PEER FILING SHARING: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2010), https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/peer-peer-file-sharing-guide-business [https://perma.
cc/J8TU-MCFA] (outlining best practices for corporate use of peer-to-peer networks); Jessica L. Rich, 
Comment, Big Data, Consumer Privacy, and Consumer Bill of Rights, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 1, 
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/573301/140801bigdatacomment.
pdf [https://perma.cc/5W96-RP44] (clarifying the FTC’s position on developments in “big data”). 
 94 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 165–66 (4th ed. 
2017) (indicating the FTC settlement agreements have common requirements surrounding privacy 
policies, auditing, recordkeeping, risk assessment, and employee training). 
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termining whether the petitioner had been provided fair notice of the FTC’s in-
terpretation of unfairness.95 Although these material and settlement agreements 
do not constitute binding precedent, courts frequently consider administrative 
materials that are neither regulations nor binding court decisions.96 Indeed, pri-
vacy professionals generally regard FTC settlement agreements as carrying 
precedential force.97 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit wholly ignored them.98 
Furthermore, the court did little to clarify why reasonableness is an exceedingly 
vague standard within the data security enforcement context, but it is sufficiently 
specific in other areas of the law.99 
The court also did not address the long-term implications of constraining 
the FTC’s remedial powers.100 LabMD III mandated that the FTC remediate data 
privacy and security actions with greater specificity.101 In effect, this requires the 
FTC to issue backward-looking consent orders that obligate companies to im-
plement data security programs built on then-existing technologies.102 Before 
LabMD III, FTC consent orders accounted for new and emerging technologies 
because the FTC could easily redefine reasonableness through its guidelines and 
settlements.103 Post-LabMD III, the FTC will likely struggle to draft language 
that is sufficiently broad enough to accommodate key technological changes.104 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2015). But 
see Geoffrey A. Manne & Kristian Stout, When “Reasonable” Isn’t: The FTC’s Standardless Data 
Security Standard, 15 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 67, 75 (2019) (contending that the FTC’s materials and 
settlement agreement fail to create a common law-like framework that shares the “rigor of a judicial 
opinion”). 
 96 Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 257. 
 97 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, at 621. 
 98 See generally LabMD III, 894 F.3d 1221 (lacking consideration of FTC administrative materi-
als and settlement agreements). 
 99 See, e.g., Solove & Hartzog, supra note 90 (arguing that the body of law surrounding data 
privacy and security enforcement is not particularly vague in comparison to other areas of the law). 
For example, the Eleventh Circuit previously held that credit reporting agencies must conduct reason-
able investigations of consumer disputes under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Hinkle v. Midland 
Credit Mgmt, Inc., 827 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2016). The court also held that plaintiffs cannot 
bring employment discrimination suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act if the employer’s 
actions were reasonably motivated. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030–31 (11th Cir. 
2000). 
 100 See LabMD III, 894 F.3d at 1236–37 (addressing the perceived ill-effects of upholding the 
reasonableness standard, but failing to consider the long-term implications of requiring specificity in 
consent orders). 
 101 Id. at 1236–37 
 102 See Skelton, supra note 38, at 306 (suggesting the pre-LabMD III FTC enforcement scheme 
provided a meaningful contrast to federal laws that lagged behind developments in technology). 
 103 See id. at 323 (noting that, prior to LabMD III, the FTC efficiently policed companies working 
with new technologies that failed to implement reasonable safeguards). 
 104 See Jim Harvey et al., LabMD: The End of the FTC in Cyber, or Just a New Path?, ALSTON & 
BIRD: PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY ADVISORY (Jul. 9, 2018), https://www.alstonprivacy.com/labmd-
the-end-of-the-ftc-in-cyber-or-just-a-new-path/ [https://perma.cc/3FPR-F6LG] (positing that LabMD 
III will challenge the FTC to draft consent orders that are narrow enough to comply with the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision, but also broad enough to account for technological developments). 
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By restraining the FTC’s remedial powers, LabMD III also casts doubt over 
the FTC’s ability to enforce existing consent orders that employ similarly broad 
remedial language.105 If the FTC attempts to enforce these consent orders, the 
respondents would be in strong defensive positions to invalidate them.106 Even 
though LabMD III is not binding outside the Eleventh Circuit, it could serve as 
highly persuasive authority in federal courts nationwide.107 Accordingly, compa-
nies that have experienced massive data security failures could be held unac-
countable for future data breaches.108 
CONCLUSION 
LabMD III presents more questions than answers about the future of FTC 
data privacy and security enforcement actions. The Eleventh Circuit should have 
seized the opportunity to provide necessary clarity as to the scope of the FTC’s 
enforcement authority. Instead, the court perpetuated uncertainty by evading 
LabMD III’s central issue, while also introducing a new requirement surrounding 
the meaning of unfairness. Moreover, the court unduly constrained the FTC’s 
remedial powers. By striking down the FTC’s interpretation of reasonable con-
sent order, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the history and context surrounding FTC 
enforcement actions. As a result, LabMD III placed the FTC in a weakened posi-
tion without creating a clear mechanism for the regulation of new technologies 
or existing consent orders. 
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 105 Eleventh Circuit LabMD Decision Significantly Restrains FTC’s Remedial Powers in Data Secu-
rity and Privacy Actions, WILSON, SONSINI, GOODRICH & ROSATI (June 18, 2018), https://www.wsgr.
com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgralert-LabMD.htm [https://perma.
cc/6722-CMCL] [hereinafter Remedial Powers] (addressing possible implications of LabMD III). 
 106 See id. (suggesting that companies currently bound by broadly-worded FTC consent orders 
could cite LabMD III as authority for invalidating those consent orders). 
 107 See Chad Flanders, Toward a Theory of Persuasive Authority, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 63–64 
(2009) (indicating that the opinions of other circuit courts carry greater weight than any other form of 
persuasive authority). 
 108 See Remedial Powers, supra note 105 (contending that the validity of all existing FTC data pri-
vacy and security settlement agreements brought under Section 5’s unfairness prong remains uncertain). 
